mirror of
https://github.com/SagerNet/sing-box.git
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881 lines
25 KiB
Go
881 lines
25 KiB
Go
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// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package tls
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"crypto/x509"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"hash"
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"io"
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"time"
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)
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// serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress.
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// It's discarded once the handshake has completed.
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type serverHandshakeState struct {
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c *Conn
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ctx context.Context
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clientHello *clientHelloMsg
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hello *serverHelloMsg
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suite *cipherSuite
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ecdheOk bool
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ecSignOk bool
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rsaDecryptOk bool
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rsaSignOk bool
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sessionState *sessionState
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finishedHash finishedHash
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masterSecret []byte
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cert *Certificate
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}
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// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server.
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func (c *Conn) serverHandshake(ctx context.Context) error {
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clientHello, err := c.readClientHello(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if c.vers == VersionTLS13 {
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hs := serverHandshakeStateTLS13{
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c: c,
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ctx: ctx,
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clientHello: clientHello,
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}
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return hs.handshake()
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}
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hs := serverHandshakeState{
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c: c,
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ctx: ctx,
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clientHello: clientHello,
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}
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return hs.handshake()
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// For an overview of TLS handshaking, see RFC 5246, Section 7.3.
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c.buffering = true
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if hs.checkForResumption() {
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// The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake.
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c.didResume = true
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if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false
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if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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} else {
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// The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't
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// valid so we do a full handshake.
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if err := hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true
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c.buffering = true
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if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
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c.isHandshakeComplete.Store(true)
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return nil
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}
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// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message and selects the protocol version.
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func (c *Conn) readClientHello(ctx context.Context) (*clientHelloMsg, error) {
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return nil, unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg)
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}
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var configForClient *Config
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originalConfig := c.config
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if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil {
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chi := clientHelloInfo(ctx, c, clientHello)
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if configForClient, err = c.config.GetConfigForClient(chi); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return nil, err
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} else if configForClient != nil {
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c.config = configForClient
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}
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}
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c.ticketKeys = originalConfig.ticketKeys(configForClient)
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clientVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
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if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
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clientVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
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}
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c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(roleServer, clientVersions)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered only unsupported versions: %x", clientVersions)
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}
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c.haveVers = true
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c.in.version = c.vers
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c.out.version = c.vers
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return clientHello, nil
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() error {
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c := hs.c
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hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
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hs.hello.vers = c.vers
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foundCompression := false
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// We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
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for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods {
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if compression == compressionNone {
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foundCompression = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !foundCompression {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections")
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}
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hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
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serverRandom := hs.hello.random
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// Downgrade protection canaries. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3.
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maxVers := c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer)
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if maxVers >= VersionTLS12 && c.vers < maxVers || testingOnlyForceDowngradeCanary {
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if c.vers == VersionTLS12 {
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copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS12)
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} else {
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copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS11)
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}
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serverRandom = serverRandom[:24]
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}
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_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), serverRandom)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
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}
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hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported
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hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
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if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 {
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c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
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}
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selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
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return err
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}
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hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
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c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
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hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(clientHelloInfo(hs.ctx, c, hs.clientHello))
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if err != nil {
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if err == errNoCertificates {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnrecognizedName)
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} else {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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}
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return err
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}
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if hs.clientHello.scts {
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hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps
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}
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hs.ecdheOk = supportsECDHE(c.config, hs.clientHello.supportedCurves, hs.clientHello.supportedPoints)
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if hs.ecdheOk && len(hs.clientHello.supportedPoints) > 0 {
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// Although omitting the ec_point_formats extension is permitted, some
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// old OpenSSL version will refuse to handshake if not present.
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//
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// Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the
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// uncompressed point format. See golang.org/issue/31943.
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hs.hello.supportedPoints = []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed}
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}
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if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok {
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switch priv.Public().(type) {
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case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
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hs.ecSignOk = true
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case ed25519.PublicKey:
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hs.ecSignOk = true
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case *rsa.PublicKey:
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hs.rsaSignOk = true
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default:
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signing key type (%T)", priv.Public())
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}
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}
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if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok {
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switch priv.Public().(type) {
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case *rsa.PublicKey:
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hs.rsaDecryptOk = true
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default:
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported decryption key type (%T)", priv.Public())
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// negotiateALPN picks a shared ALPN protocol that both sides support in server
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// preference order. If ALPN is not configured or the peer doesn't support it,
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// it returns "" and no error.
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func negotiateALPN(serverProtos, clientProtos []string) (string, error) {
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if len(serverProtos) == 0 || len(clientProtos) == 0 {
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return "", nil
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}
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var http11fallback bool
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for _, s := range serverProtos {
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for _, c := range clientProtos {
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if s == c {
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return s, nil
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}
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if s == "h2" && c == "http/1.1" {
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http11fallback = true
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}
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}
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}
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// As a special case, let http/1.1 clients connect to h2 servers as if they
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// didn't support ALPN. We used not to enforce protocol overlap, so over
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// time a number of HTTP servers were configured with only "h2", but
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// expected to accept connections from "http/1.1" clients. See Issue 46310.
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if http11fallback {
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return "", nil
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}
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return "", fmt.Errorf("tls: client requested unsupported application protocols (%s)", clientProtos)
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}
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// supportsECDHE returns whether ECDHE key exchanges can be used with this
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// pre-TLS 1.3 client.
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func supportsECDHE(c *Config, supportedCurves []CurveID, supportedPoints []uint8) bool {
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supportsCurve := false
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for _, curve := range supportedCurves {
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if c.supportsCurve(curve) {
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supportsCurve = true
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break
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}
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}
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supportsPointFormat := false
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for _, pointFormat := range supportedPoints {
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if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed {
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supportsPointFormat = true
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break
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}
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}
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// Per RFC 8422, Section 5.1.2, if the Supported Point Formats extension is
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// missing, uncompressed points are supported. If supportedPoints is empty,
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// the extension must be missing, as an empty extension body is rejected by
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// the parser. See https://go.dev/issue/49126.
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if len(supportedPoints) == 0 {
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supportsPointFormat = true
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}
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return supportsCurve && supportsPointFormat
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error {
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c := hs.c
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preferenceOrder := cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder
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if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport || !aesgcmPreferred(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites) {
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preferenceOrder = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES
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}
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configCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites()
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preferenceList := make([]uint16, 0, len(configCipherSuites))
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for _, suiteID := range preferenceOrder {
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for _, id := range configCipherSuites {
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if id == suiteID {
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preferenceList = append(preferenceList, id)
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break
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}
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}
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}
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hs.suite = selectCipherSuite(preferenceList, hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, hs.cipherSuiteOk)
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if hs.suite == nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
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}
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c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
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for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
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if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV {
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// The client is doing a fallback connection. See RFC 7507.
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if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) {
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c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback)
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return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback")
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}
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break
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) cipherSuiteOk(c *cipherSuite) bool {
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if c.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 {
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if !hs.ecdheOk {
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return false
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}
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if c.flags&suiteECSign != 0 {
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if !hs.ecSignOk {
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return false
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}
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} else if !hs.rsaSignOk {
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return false
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}
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} else if !hs.rsaDecryptOk {
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return false
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}
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if hs.c.vers < VersionTLS12 && c.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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// checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection.
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool {
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c := hs.c
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if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
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return false
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}
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plaintext, usedOldKey := c.decryptTicket(hs.clientHello.sessionTicket)
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if plaintext == nil {
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return false
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}
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hs.sessionState = &sessionState{usedOldKey: usedOldKey}
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ok := hs.sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext)
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if !ok {
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return false
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}
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createdAt := time.Unix(int64(hs.sessionState.createdAt), 0)
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if c.config.time().Sub(createdAt) > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
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return false
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}
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// Never resume a session for a different TLS version.
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if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers {
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return false
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}
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cipherSuiteOk := false
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// Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session.
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for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
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if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite {
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cipherSuiteOk = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !cipherSuiteOk {
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return false
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}
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// Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session.
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hs.suite = selectCipherSuite([]uint16{hs.sessionState.cipherSuite},
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c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.cipherSuiteOk)
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if hs.suite == nil {
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return false
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}
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sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0
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needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth)
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if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
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return false
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}
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if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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||
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error {
|
||
|
c := hs.c
|
||
|
|
||
|
hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
|
||
|
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
|
||
|
// We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know
|
||
|
// that we're doing a resumption.
|
||
|
hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
|
||
|
hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
|
||
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
|
||
|
Certificate: hs.sessionState.certificates,
|
||
|
}); err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
|
||
|
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret
|
||
|
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
|
||
|
c := hs.c
|
||
|
|
||
|
if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 {
|
||
|
hs.hello.ocspStapling = true
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled
|
||
|
hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
|
||
|
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(hs.c.vers, hs.suite)
|
||
|
if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
|
||
|
// No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client
|
||
|
// certificates won't be used.
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
|
||
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
|
||
|
certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
|
||
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if hs.hello.ocspStapling {
|
||
|
certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg)
|
||
|
certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal())
|
||
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
|
||
|
skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello)
|
||
|
if err != nil {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if skx != nil {
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
|
||
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
var certReq *certificateRequestMsg
|
||
|
if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
|
||
|
// Request a client certificate
|
||
|
certReq = new(certificateRequestMsg)
|
||
|
certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{
|
||
|
byte(certTypeRSASign),
|
||
|
byte(certTypeECDSASign),
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
|
||
|
certReq.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
|
||
|
certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms()
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
|
||
|
// the client that it may send any certificate in response
|
||
|
// to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then
|
||
|
// we can send them down, so that the client can choose
|
||
|
// an appropriate certificate to give to us.
|
||
|
if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
|
||
|
certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
|
||
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
|
||
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any
|
||
|
|
||
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
||
|
if err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
|
||
|
// certificate message, even if it's empty.
|
||
|
if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
|
||
|
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
|
||
|
if !ok {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||
|
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
|
||
|
|
||
|
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
|
||
|
Certificate: certMsg.certificates,
|
||
|
}); err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if len(certMsg.certificates) != 0 {
|
||
|
pub = c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
|
||
|
if err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
|
||
|
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Get client key exchange
|
||
|
ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
|
||
|
if !ok {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||
|
return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
|
||
|
|
||
|
preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers)
|
||
|
if err != nil {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
|
||
|
if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message,
|
||
|
// the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the
|
||
|
// clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding
|
||
|
// handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding
|
||
|
// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
|
||
|
// possession of the private key of the certificate.
|
||
|
if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
|
||
|
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
|
||
|
if err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
|
||
|
if !ok {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||
|
return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
var sigType uint8
|
||
|
var sigHash crypto.Hash
|
||
|
if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
|
||
|
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||
|
return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
|
||
|
if err != nil {
|
||
|
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub)
|
||
|
if err != nil {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
signed := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, sigHash)
|
||
|
if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, pub, sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
|
||
|
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
|
||
|
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
|
||
|
c := hs.c
|
||
|
|
||
|
clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV := keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
|
||
|
|
||
|
var clientCipher, serverCipher any
|
||
|
var clientHash, serverHash hash.Hash
|
||
|
|
||
|
if hs.suite.aead == nil {
|
||
|
clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */)
|
||
|
clientHash = hs.suite.mac(clientMAC)
|
||
|
serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */)
|
||
|
serverHash = hs.suite.mac(serverMAC)
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
|
||
|
serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
|
||
|
c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
|
||
|
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
|
||
|
c := hs.c
|
||
|
|
||
|
if err := c.readChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
||
|
if err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
|
||
|
if !ok {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||
|
return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
||
|
if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
|
||
|
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
||
|
return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
|
||
|
copy(out, verify)
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
|
||
|
// ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the
|
||
|
// ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session
|
||
|
// ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent.
|
||
|
if !hs.hello.ticketSupported {
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
c := hs.c
|
||
|
m := new(newSessionTicketMsg)
|
||
|
|
||
|
createdAt := uint64(c.config.time().Unix())
|
||
|
if hs.sessionState != nil {
|
||
|
// If this is re-wrapping an old key, then keep
|
||
|
// the original time it was created.
|
||
|
createdAt = hs.sessionState.createdAt
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
var certsFromClient [][]byte
|
||
|
for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates {
|
||
|
certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
state := sessionState{
|
||
|
vers: c.vers,
|
||
|
cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
|
||
|
createdAt: createdAt,
|
||
|
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
|
||
|
certificates: certsFromClient,
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
var err error
|
||
|
m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal())
|
||
|
if err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal())
|
||
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
|
||
|
c := hs.c
|
||
|
|
||
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
finished := new(finishedMsg)
|
||
|
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
||
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
|
||
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
copy(out, finished.verifyData)
|
||
|
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a
|
||
|
// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns
|
||
|
// the public key of the leaf certificate.
|
||
|
func (c *Conn) processCertsFromClient(certificate Certificate) error {
|
||
|
certificates := certificate.Certificate
|
||
|
certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates))
|
||
|
var err error
|
||
|
for i, asn1Data := range certificates {
|
||
|
if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
||
|
return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error())
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if len(certs) == 0 && requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
||
|
return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate")
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 {
|
||
|
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
|
||
|
Roots: c.config.ClientCAs,
|
||
|
CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
|
||
|
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
|
||
|
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
|
||
|
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts)
|
||
|
if err != nil {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
||
|
return &CertificateVerificationError{UnverifiedCertificates: certs, Err: err}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
c.verifiedChains = chains
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
c.peerCertificates = certs
|
||
|
c.ocspResponse = certificate.OCSPStaple
|
||
|
c.scts = certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
|
||
|
|
||
|
if len(certs) > 0 {
|
||
|
switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
|
||
|
case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey, ed25519.PublicKey:
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
|
||
|
return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil {
|
||
|
if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil {
|
||
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func clientHelloInfo(ctx context.Context, c *Conn, clientHello *clientHelloMsg) *ClientHelloInfo {
|
||
|
supportedVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
|
||
|
if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
|
||
|
supportedVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return &ClientHelloInfo{
|
||
|
CipherSuites: clientHello.cipherSuites,
|
||
|
ServerName: clientHello.serverName,
|
||
|
SupportedCurves: clientHello.supportedCurves,
|
||
|
SupportedPoints: clientHello.supportedPoints,
|
||
|
SignatureSchemes: clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
|
||
|
SupportedProtos: clientHello.alpnProtocols,
|
||
|
SupportedVersions: supportedVersions,
|
||
|
Conn: c.conn,
|
||
|
config: c.config,
|
||
|
ctx: ctx,
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|